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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CURTIS RAY
MICKELSON, Defpllclallt and Respondent.

)

[lao 1b] Searches and Seizures-Investigations Falling Short of
Search.-The rule thnt circlllllstnnCE's short of probable causc
to makE' an arrest Illay still justify an officpr's stopping pedestrians or motorists on the street for questioning does not conflict with U.S. Const., 4th Amend., forbidding unreasonable
searches and seizures, but strikes a balance betwecn a person's interest in illlmunity from police interference and the
community's interest in law enforcement, and wards off pressure to equate reasonable cause to investigate with reasonable
cause to arrest, thus protecting the innocent from the risk of
arrest when no more than rensonable investigation is justified.
[2] Id.-Validity of Police Procedure.-A state ntle gO"erlliw~
police procedure with respect to searches nnd seizures is not
unconstitutional merely because it permits conduct in which 11
federal officer may not lawfully engage.
(3] Id.-Validity of Police Procedure.-Before a state ntle governing police conduct with respect to searches and spizure;;
may be struck down, it must appear that neither Congress 1W1"
a state. legislature could authorize it; if a state adopts rulcs
of police conduct consistent with the requirements of U.S.
Const., 4th Amend., forbidtling unreasonable searches and
seizures, and if its officers follow those rules, they do not act
unreasonably within the. meaning of the amendment although
different ntles may govern federal officers.
[4] Id.-Search of Vehicles-Reasonable Cause.-Althongh it was
not unreasonable for a police officer to stop an automobile
for investigation and to take rea~onable precautions for his
own safety in view of the fact that the driver's description
was similar to the description, previously given to the. officer,
of the robber of a market, a search of the automobile which
turned up evidence conn('cting a passenge.r in the vehicle
to burgll1ries of telephone booths exeeeded the bounds of
reasonable investigation and was not justified by probable
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2tl, Searches alltI Seizures, § 31.
[4] Search of automobile without warrant by office.rs relying on
description of persons suspected of a crime, note, 60 A.L.R. 299.
See also Ca1.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 43; Am.Jar., Searches
and Seizures (1st ed § 18).
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 6; [2, 3]
Searches and Seizures, § 1; [4] Searches and Seizures, § 3L
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to mnke un llrl'C,,;t where tlll'rc cuuhl hU\'e been more
th:tn onc person abroad Ilt night who fitted till' al'scription of
the market robber, where the drivcr, though ill the vicinity
of the rohbery, was not obser\'ed until about 20 minutcs after
it occurrl'd whl'n he WllS driving toward the scene of the crime,
not tlWIlY from it, whl're the ofticer's in\'"estigation elicited
idcntification on reque~t llm} a story t'ollsistl'nt with the automobile's movcments llud the oitiel'l"s own assessment of those
movements, and whel'c the OCCUIJltllts of the Cllr were out of the
cllr and UWlly from ully weapon,,; that might ha're been concealcd thcrein.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County setting aside all information. Walter R.
Evans, Judge.- Affirmed.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attol'lll'y General, William B. 1\1cKessoll, District Attorney, Harry 'Vood and Harry Sondheim, Deputy District
Attorneys, for Plaintiff alld Appellant.
Gladys Towles Root, Eugene V. McPherson and Philip C.
Greenwald for Defendant and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defclldant was charged in two counts of
an information with committing burglaries of telephone booths,
in violation of Penul Code, section 459. His motion to set
aside the information was granted (Pen. Code, § 995), and
the People appeal. The Attorney General concedes that there
was 110 evidence at the preliminary hearing to support count I
ana seeks a reversal only as to count II.
A Burbank police officer discovered the physical evidence
supporting count II in the course of searching an overnight
bag found under the front seat of an automobile in which
defendant had bcen riding and which Don Zauzig had been
driving. The bag contained $85.90 in nickels, dimes, and quarters. At defen{iant's preliminary hearing, the bag and its
contents were introduced ill evidence, and Zanzig testified
to his and defel1dal1t'~ coml\lissi~n of the bnrglary. Zausig's
arrest and his availability as a ""itness were direct results of
the search that disclo:!cd the' physical evid('nce of the burglary.
If that search was ill('gal,neither the physical evidence nor
Zauzig's testimony is competent to support the information.
-.Aasiped by Chairman of Judicial Council.
•
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(Sil'vCl'tlt07'lIe Lbr. Co. v. United Sta'('.~, :!ij! U.S. 385, 392
[40 S.Ct. 182, G.\: L.Rd. 319, ;)21, 24 .A.I.J.R 1426, 1428];
Weiss v. linited Statts, 308 U.S. 321, 330-3:n [60 S.Ot. 269,
84 L.I~u. 298, 303J ; Nardone Y. r:llitcd States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 [60 S.Ot. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307, 311-312]; Wong Sl'" v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 [83 S.Ot. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d
441] ; People v. Bagel', 4,1 Oa1.211 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509] ;
People v. Dixon, 46 Ca1.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557] ; People
v. Schaumloffcl, 53 Ca1.2d 96, 101·102 [346 P.2d 393];
People v. Ditson, 57 Ca1.2d 415, 439 [20 Oal.Rptr. 165, 369
P.2d 714].)
The Attorney General contends, however, that the arresting
officer had reasonable cause to arrest Zauzig for a rec~llt rob·
bery in the neighborhood and that the search of the car was
therefore justified as incidental to the arrest. Before the <1,.cision of the United States Supremc Court in Map}) v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ot. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081], ,,','
,vere free to determine such an issue under the Cali l'ol'llia
decisions setting forth the rules governing police inwstiga.
tions and arrests. In view of the holding in that case that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires state courts to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence, we must determine at the
outset whether the federal rules governing police invef'tiga.
tions and arrests have superseded our own. TIH'n! are
significant differences between the respective rules that are
relevant to this case.
In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 [80 S.Ot. 168,
4 L.Ed.2d 134, 139], the United States Supreme Court held
that an arrest occurs ''fhen an automobile is stopped during
the course of a criminal investigation, and if the officer docs
not have reasonable cause to arrest the occupant at that tim!',
the arrest is unlawful. Anything the officer lcarns as a result
of stopping the automobile is inadmissible in evidence and
cannot justify a search. (See also Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 166 [69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.E<1. 1879, 1885J; Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-262 [80 S.Ot. 1431, 4
L.Ed.2d 1688, il693"1694].) [1a] In this state, however,
we have consistently held that circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest ~ay still justify an officer's
stopping pedestrians or motorists on the streets for question·
ing. If the circumstances warrant it, he may in self.protection
request a suspect to alight from an automobile or to submit
to a superficial search for concealed weapons. Should the
I investigation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, the
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officer may UlTt'lSt the lSusp~ct and COIiUl!ct a reasonable inciuental search. (l'eople v. Simon, 4.:; Ca1.2d 645, 650 [290
P.2d 531] ; People v. ilJa/'tin, 46 Cal.:!ll 106, 108 [29:3 P.2d
52] ; People v. Blodgett, 46 Ca1.2d 114, 117 [293 P.2tl 57] ;
PCO})[c v. Beverly, 200 Cal..App.~(l 119, 125 [19 Ca1.Rptr.
67]; ['cople v. King, 17i'i C31.AI'P.2d 386, 390 [346 P.2d
235] ; People \' . .:1llllshct'itz, lS3 Cal.App.2d 75~, 755 [6 Cal.
Rptr.78':;].)
The Mapp case did not determine whether or not the states
must follow all the federal rules. ~either did Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 [80 S.Ct. 1437, 145:3, 4 L.Ed.2d
1669], which Oil this matter held only that the condud of
state offieers would be measured against the federal rules
when state-secured evidl'l1ce was offered in federal prosecutions.
[2] A state rule gov('1'ning police procedure is not uncon·
stitutional merely because it permits conduct in which a federal officer may not lawfully engage. The Fourth Amend.
ment! itself sets forth 110 more than the basic outlines of
lawful law enforcement. It becomes meaningful in specific
situations only by reference to the common law and statutory
law governing the issuance of warrants, the authority of
officers, and the power to arrest. Illcgally obtained evidence
may be excluded by the federal courts for various reasons.
It may be excluded because it was obtained in a way that
could not constitutionally be authorizcd. It may be excluded
because it was obtained in violation of a federal statute or
a common-law rule or a state rale applicable to federal
officers. It may be exelnded by virtue of the Supreme Court's
monitorship of the federal administration of criminal justice.
(Fed. R. Crim. Proc., 3, 4, 26, 41; 18 U.S.C. App., pp. 34073452 (1958).)
The United States Supreme Court has not interpreted the
Fourth Amendment as requiring that court to day do\vn as a
matter of constitutional law pre('isc rules of police conduct.
Indeed, its rule allowing a srarch by a fcderal officer without
a warrant as incident to a lawful arrest pcrmits reference to
state law to determine the validity or the arrest. (Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S.
15 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436,

19,

'" The right of tl,e people to be sI'eure ill their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against ulIl'L'a~onn]'Je sean'hc~ and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, Lut upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly d(>seribing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
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441] ; United Statcs v. Di Rc, 332 U.S. 581, 589 [68 S.C't. 222,
92 L.Ed. 210, 2171.) [3] Accordingly, berol'e a state rule
governing police conduct may be struck down, it must aplwar
that neither Congress nor a state legislature could authori:~l'
it. If a state adopts rules of police couduct cOllsistent with
the requirement>; of the Fourth Amendment amI if its officers
follow those rules, they do not act unreasonably within the
lIleaning of the amendment although differellt rules Illay
govern federal officers.
[lb] We do not believe that our rule permitting temporary
detention for questioning conflicts with the Fourth Amendment. It strikes a balance between a persoll's intercst ill immuuity from police illterference and the commuuity's interest
in law enforcemeut. It wards off pressure to equate rea!;onable cause to investigate with reasonable cause to arrest, tIm!;
protecting the i11110ccnt from the risk of arrest wh(>n no mort'
than reasonable investigation is justified. (See Darrett, Pr/,sonal Rights, P/,0PC1·ty Rights, a-lid The Fourth A.mcndlllrnt,
1960 Sup.Ct. Rev. 46,65-66,69-70.)
The United States Supreme Court apparently concluded tl1at
the situations presented in the Henry, Rios, and Brinegar
cases allowed 110 middle ground (sec dissenting opinion of
Jackson, J. in Brinegar v. UnUccl States, 338 U.S. 160, 183
[69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1894]), and hence that the
officers were uot justified in stopping the defendants' automobiles unless they had probable cause to make arrests. It
does not follow that its conclusion was constitutionally compelled. Given the absence of legislation, the court had to
articulate the governing rule and enforce compliance with it.
It did not thereby foreclose Congress or the states from articulating other reasonable rules consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
[ 4] It remains to determine whether the sC'arch in this case
complied with the rules of this state. The arresting officer
testified that he arrested defendant aud Zauzig shortly before
2 a.m. about 20 minutes after he had gone to a market on
San Fernando Road where a robbery had just been reported.
He was told by other officers at the market that the robber
was a fairly tall white man of large build with dark hair
who was wearing.a rcd sweater and armed with a .45 automatic. The officer searched the area on foot for about 10
minutes and then rl'turned to his car to !;carch a wider area.
While driving west on Providenci~ about !;ix hlocks from the
market he saw a station wagon coming toward him with two

)
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1I('1':;oIlS ill it. 'J'llt' dri\'l'L' aPI"'al'l'rl to L~ a hug'·.' white man
wHit dal'l, hail' w,'arillg' a ."',1 S\\'l'atel' or jaekL't, The officer
saw thc ::;tatio11 wagon turll l:iouth on San Fernando toward
the lllal'ket, alltI hc tlll'lled south illto an alley and then west
at thc next Sh'l'd, He then saw the station wagon turn west
f.'olll Sun l'\~L'lIalldo Oil the sallie str'eet and followed it, The
station wagoll WClit to the cud of the street wh('re it came
to Il l!t'adl'IHI, made a U-t urll, aud proceeded back toward
San Fernando, 'fhe officer cil'ckd a block to his right aud
1u1'llt',1 sonth on San PCL'wu\(lo, lIe was then a block or two
hehind the :station wagon, wIdth was traveling' south on San
1·'cril:mJo at about 25 or 30 lUiles per hour, The officer overtook the station ',ragon alld obsl'l'Yed the paSSl'nger "bend
i"JL'ward ill the st'at, fOi'\\'i\l'd and down and rais~ back up."
He tUl'JlCU on his red light, the :,:tl1tio11 wagon pulled over
nllll stopped, and tllC ofill'er parked behind it, III" radioed
his location to hl':lll'1uaL'tl'I's and l'e1luestell a backup car for
assistmlCc, Meanwhile Zan7ig got out of the dl'ivt:'1"s seat of
thc station m:g'oll and walkl'd to the officer's car, The officer
asl,ed Zauzig wlll'l'e ile was gOillg', alHl Z;{l1zig' told him he
was gOillg hOlllc to UI('lJ(lale, that he was more or less lost,
and had heen driying up aull downsidestrt'ets looking for the
fL'eeway. He :;howed the officer his driyt·1"s license. The
a:,;sisting offic('I'S al'l'ivC'u, IlIllI the offic('l's Hnd Zauzig walked
to the station wagon. Defendant was sittillg in the right front
seat and got out on request. The arresting officer looked
under the right fl'~lIlt seat and on the floorboards and saw an
overnight bag stuffed ulltlt>r the right front seat. He pulled
it out, unzipped it, amI saw four sCi'cwdri"ers, a flashlight, a
pair of canvas glovl'3 alld two socks. One sock was knotted
at the top and was filled with something that jingled, \Vhen
he took the hag out of the car, the officer asked Zauzig w11at
it was, aud Znnzig told him that it was his basketball equipment. The offlccr u"kcd what was in the sock, and Zauzig
told him that he had some dimes. The officer opened the
sock and founu nick('18, dimes, and quarters, He arrested
Zauzig amI (It·fl'IHlant 011 suspicion of burglary. The officer
also testified that tht'l'e was lIothing in his conversation with
Zauzig that ~\'ould it~(lieate that he had perpctrated a robbery
other than that he adcd a hit fl'it'mlly, The Il1nvements of
the car were suelL that. it was 01)vious that the occupants were
either tryillg to ('vade tlw offil'cl' or were confused and did
1I0t know the art'a vcry wrIt. IIis purpose in examining the
bag was the "possibility of a gun being there." After he

)
454

PEOl'l-,E

v.

Mll.'KI::LSON

[59 C.2d

had talked [0 Zau .. i 6 :.tau (ld'lHtlant he was satisfi.l'll that they
had not bel'll involved iu tile rohbery.
It WliS not ullreasonable fot' til(' ofi1cl'l' to stop Zau7Jg's car
for investigation audto take reasonable preeantiolls for his
own ~afety. He did not have prohahleeause, however, to
arrest Zauzig for l'obbery. 'l'hcre could have been more than
one tall white lUan with dark hait· wparing a red sweater
abroad at night in such a ml'tl'opolitan m·ea. Although Zallzig was in the viciuity of the robhery, he was 110t observed
until about 20 minute'S aftcr :t ot'clll'l"nl wl1I'lI II(' was driving
toward the ::celle of the crime, not away from it. The officer
had no information that the robber hail ail automobile or a
coufederate. 'rhc erratic route of the car and defendant's
lllowmellt in the scat werc. at lUOst suspicious circumstances.
Theoffieer's inve;,tigation clicited id('lltification upon reqnest
and a story consistent with the movements of the car and
the officer's own assessment of those movements. Both oceupallt;; were out of the car away from any weapous that might
have heen concealed therein. Illsteail of interrogating Zauzig and defendant with respect to the robbery or rcquestil\~
them to aecompany the officers the few blocks to the market
for possible identification, the officer elected to rummage
through closed baggage found in the car in the hope of turning up evidence that might eOlmect Zauzig with the robbery.
'£hat search exceeded the bounds of reasonable investigation.
It was not justified by probable cause to make an arrest, and
it cannot be justified by what it turned up. (People v. Brow?1,.
45 Ca1.2d 640, 643·644 [290 P.2d 528) ,)
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer,J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.
PETERS, J.-I concur.
I agree tlmt the search hl'1"e involved was illegal, both under
state and federal law. Therefore, I agree that the order
appealed from must be affirmed. But, in my opinioll, smeh
holding makes it unncccssary to discuss the scope and impact
on state law of the decision of lrlapp v. Ohio, 367 F.S. 643
[81 S.Ct. 1684,~6 L.Ed.2d 1081]. In myopinioll the determination of that important eOll-;titutional qUe'stion should be
left to a case where it is directly involved.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reVl'rse the order of the
trial court as to count II amI afI1rlll the order as to count I,
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for the rcasons expressed by Mr. Presiding Justice Fox in the
opinion prepared by him '::01' the District Court of Appeal
in PCOlllo v. Mickelson (Ca1.App.) 26 Cal.Rptr. 152.
App('llant's petition for a rl'hcarillg' was ueni,.'u l\Iay 14,
1963. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition shouhl
be granted.

